Everything We Know So Far About Drone Strikes

The United States campaign against militants in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia has been a cornerstone of the Obama administration’s national security approach. While details of the campaign remain largely secret, it is widely known that it involves a “kill list” and the use of drones. This guide outlines what is known and unknown about the campaign.

Where is the drone war? Who carries it out?

Since the 9/11 terror attacks, the Obama administration has increasingly relied on drones as their weapon of choice for targeting militants outside of Iraq and Afghanistan. Estimates suggest that 95 percent of targeted killings since then have been conducted by drones, which provide the benefit of not putting American troops in harm’s way. The first reported drone strike against Al Qaeda was in Yemen in 2002, and the CIA ramped up the use of drones in Pakistan under President George W. Bush in 2008. Under President Obama, the use of drones has expanded drastically in Pakistan and Yemen since 2011.Since the 9/11 terror attacks, the Obama administration has increasingly relied on drones as their weapon of choice for targeting militants outside of Iraq and Afghanistan. Estimates suggest that 95 percent of targeted killings since then have been conducted by drones, which provide the benefit of not putting American troops in harm’s way. The first reported drone strike against Al Qaeda was in Yemen in 2002, and the CIA ramped up the use of drones in Pakistan under President George W. Bush in 2008. Under President Obama, the use of drones has expanded drastically in Pakistan and Yemen since 2011.The Central Intelligence Agency is not the only entity conducting drone strikes. The United States military has acknowledged the use of “direct action” in Yemen and Somalia, attributed to the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). Since the events of 9/11, JSOC has grown exponentially, taking on both intelligence-gathering and combat roles. Most notably, JSOC was responsible for the operation that resulted in the death of Osama Bin Laden.The U.S. drone war is being conducted remotely from a network of secret bases around the world. According to The Washington Post, who examined construction contracts and visited the base in Djibouti from which many of the strikes on Yemen and Somalia are carried out, the war is being waged without the public’s knowledge. Wired recently documented the war against Somalia’s al-Shabaab militant group and the U.S.’s increased military presence in Africa.

The number of strikes in Pakistan has dropped since its peak of over 100 in 2008, with an estimated 46 last year. However, the strikes in Yemen increased, with more than 40 reported in the same year. In the first 10 days of 2013, there have already been seven strikes in Pakistan.

Drone War Jargon

The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), an act of Congress passed in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, granted the President the authority to take “all necessary and appropriate force” against any person or group involved in the attacks or harboring those who were. Both Presidents Bush and Obama have cited the AUMF in their claims of broad authority to detain and kill terror suspects. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the Yemen-based al Qaeda affiliate linked to the attempted Christmas Day airplane bombing in 2009, has been the target of increased U.S. strikes in the past year. These strikes have targeted AQAP leaders, as well as unspecified militants.

The United States has developed a system to track and assess potential terror targets known as the Disposition Matrix. According to The Washington Post, this system is an attempt to codify the administration’s ‘kill lists’ for the long term. Additionally, the CIA has responded to requests for information about its drone program with a Glomar response, which is a rejection asserting that the information’s mere existence can neither be confirmed nor denied. The name of this response originates from the 1968 incident when the CIA told journalists it could neither confirm nor deny the existence of a ship called the Glomar Explorer.

The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is a highly secretive and elite segment of the United States military. JSOC is responsible for carrying out the raid that led to the death of Osama Bin Laden, and for running the military’s drone programs in Yemen and Somalia. Additionally, JSOC is responsible for intelligence gathering. 

JSOC has two distinct types of strikes: personality strikes and signature strikes. Personality strikes are targeted attacks on a particular individual identified as a terrorist leader, while signature strikes are against individuals believed to be militants whose identity is not known. Signature strikes are based on a “pattern of life” analysis, which is intelligence on their behavior that suggests they are a militant. This policy was reportedly started by former President Bush in Pakistan in 2008, and is now allowed in Yemen. Terror Attack Disruption Strikes (TADS) are sometimes used to refer to strikes when the identity of the target is not known. Administration officials have stated that the criteria for TADS are different from signature strikes, although the exact differences are not clear.

How are targets chosen?

A series of articles, as well as research from Columbia Law School and the Council on Foreign Relations, have provided a partial glimpse into the process of how the U.S. selects and carries out strikes. Reports indicate that the CIA and the military have maintained overlapping “kill lists” for some time. Last spring, news accounts suggested that the military’s list was discussed in interagency meetings at the Pentagon, with the White House providing approval for proposed targets. President Obama was said to authorize particularly sensitive missions himself.

This year, the process for reviewing individuals and targeting criteria for the targeted killing program has reportedly changed. According to the Washington Post, the reviews now occur at regular interagency meetings at the National Counterterrorism Center, with recommendations sent to a panel of National Security Council officials. The final revisions are then sent to White House counterterror adviser John Brennan, before being presented to the President. Several profiles have highlighted Brennan’s powerful and controversial role in shaping the trajectory of the program, and this week, President Obama nominated him to head the CIA.

At least some CIA strikes don’t need White House signoff; the director of the CIA can reportedly green-light strikes in Pakistan. In a 2011 interview, John Rizzo, previously the CIA’s top lawyer, said agency attorneys did an exhaustive review of each target.

Doesn’t the U.S. sometimes target people whose names they don’t know?

Yes. While administration officials often frame drone strikes as going after “high-level al Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks” against the U.S., many strikes go after apparent militants whose identities the U.S. doesn’t know. The so-called “signature strikes” began under Bush in early 2008 and were expanded by Obama. Exactly what portion of strikes are signature strikes isn’t clear.

The CIA’s use of signature strikes in Pakistan has caused tensions with the White House and State Department on several occasions. One official told the New York Times that for the CIA, “three guys doing jumping jacks” could be considered a terrorist training camp.

There is debate about whether the militants targeted by the U.S. in Yemen and Somalia are actually plotting against the U.S., or if they are instead fighting against their own country. Micah Zenko, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations who has been critical of the drone program, told ProPublica that the U.S. is essentially running “a counterinsurgency air force” for allied countries. At times, strikes have relied on local intelligence that later proves faulty. The Los Angeles Times recently examined the case of a Yemeni man killed by a U.S. drone and the complex web of allegiances and politics surrounding his death.

How many people have been killed in strikes?

The number of drone strikes and their casualties is difficult to track, with estimates of the total number of strikes ranging from 2,700 to 3,000. Several organizations keep track of drone strikes and their casualties: 

  • The Long War Journal covers Pakistan and Yemen.
  • The New America Foundation covers Pakistan.
  • The London Bureau of Investigative Journalism covers Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan, as well as statistics from on drone strikes carried out in Afghanistan.

How many of those killed are have been civilians?

It is impossible to know.

There has been considerable back-and-forth about the tally of civilian casualties. For instance, the New America Foundation estimates between 261 and 305 civilians have been killed in Pakistan; The Bureau of Investigative Journalism gives a range of 475 – 891. All of the counts are much higher than the very low numbers of deaths the administration claims. (We’ve detailed inconsistencies even within those low estimates.) Some analyses show that civilian deaths have dropped proportionally in recent years.

The estimates are largely compiled by interpreting news reports relying on anonymous officials or accounts from local media, whose credibility may vary. (For example, the Washington Post reported last month that the Yemeni government often tries to conceal the U.S.’ role in airstrikes that kill civilians.)

The controversy has been compounded by the fact that the U.S. reportedly counts any military-age male killed in a drone strike as a militant. An administration official told ProPublica, “If a group of fighting-age males are in a home where we know they are constructing explosives or plotting an attack, it’s assumed that all of them are in on that effort.” It’s not clear what if any investigation occurs after the fact.

Columbia Law School conducted an in-depth analysis of what we know about the U.S.’s efforts to mitigate and calculate civilian casualties. It concluded that the drone war’s covert nature hampered accountability measures taken in traditional military actions.Another report from Stanford and NYU documented “anxiety and psychological trauma” among Pakistani villagers

Why just kill? What about capture?

Administration officials have said in speeches that militants are targeted for killing when they pose an imminent threat to the U.S. and capture isn’t feasible. But killing appears to be is far more common than capture, and accounts of strikes don’t generally shed light on “imminent” or “feasible.”  Cases involving secret, overseas captures under Obama show the political and diplomatic quandaries in deciding how and where a suspect could be picked up.

This fall, the Washington Post described something called the “disposition matrix” – a process that has contingency plans for what to do with terrorists depending where they are. The Atlantic mapped out how that decision-making might happen in the case of a U.S. citizen, based on known examples. But of course, the details of the disposition matrix, like the “kill lists” it reportedly supplants, aren’t known.

What’s the legal rationale for all this?

The Obama administration has given a series of speeches outlining the legal basis for its drone strikes. However, they never talk about specific cases. In fact, they don’t officially acknowledge the drone war at all.

The White House argues that Congress’ 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force as well as international law on nations’ right to self-defense provides a sound legal basis for targeting individuals affiliated with Al Qaeda or “associated forces,” even outside Afghanistan. This can include U.S. citizens.

“Due process,” Attorney General Eric Holder said in a speech last March, “takes into account the realities of combat.”

What form that “due process” takes hasn’t been detailed. And, as we’ve reported, the government frequently clams up when it comes to specific questions – like civilian casualties, or the reasons specific individuals were killed.

Just last week, a federal judge ruled that the government did not have to release a secret legal memo making the case for the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen. The judge also ruled the government did not have to respond to other requests seeking more information about targeted killing in general.  (In making the ruling, the judge acknowledged a “Catch-22,” saying that the government claimed, “as perfectly lawful certain actions that seem on their face incompatible with our Constitution and laws while keeping the reasons for their conclusion a secret.”)

The United States has also sought to dismiss a lawsuit brought by family members over Awlaki’s death and that of his 16-year-old son – also a United States citizen — who was killed in a drone strike.

When does the drone war end?

The administration has reportedly discussed scaling back the drone war, but by other accounts, it is formalizing the targeted killing program for the long haul. The U.S. estimates there Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has a “few thousand” members; but officials have also said the U.S. cannot “capture or kill every last terrorist who claims an affiliation with al Qaeda.”

The State Department’s legal counsel Harold Koh gave a speech last month entitled, “The Conflict Against Al Qaeda and its Affiliates: How Will It End?” He didn’t give a date.

John Brennan has reportedly said the CIA should return to its focus on intelligence-gathering. But Brennan’s key role in running the drone war from the White House has led to debate about how much he would actually curtail the agency’s involvement if he is confirmed as CIA chief.

What about backlash abroad?

There appears to be plenty of it. Drone strikes are deeply unpopular in the countries where they occur, sparking frequent protests. Despite that, Brennan said last August that the U.S. saw,“little evidence that these actions are generating widespread anti-American sentiment or recruits.”

General Stanley McChrystal, who led the military in Afghanistan, recently contradicted that, saying, “The resentment created by American use of unmanned strikes … is much greater than the average American appreciates. They are hated on a visceral level, even by people who’ve never seen one or seen the effects of one.”

The New York Times recently reported that Pakistani militants have carried out a campaign of brutal reprisals against locals, accusing them of spying for the U.S.

As for international governments: Top U.S. allies have mostly kept silent. A 2010 U.N. report raised concerns about the precedent of a covert, boundary-less war. The President of Yemen, Abdu Hadi, supports the U.S. campaign, while Pakistan maintains an uneasy combination of public protest and apparent acquiescence.

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